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Gathering Resources to Promote a Free and 
Responsible Europe 
Save the date now! 
Conference registration fee is €75 until September 15th and € 100 
after September 15th   
More: www.rbeurope.org   
 
LFMI is inviting European think-tankers to the 2nd 
ERBM in Vilnius in October 
The Lithuanian Free Market Institute (LFMI) is privileged to 
host the Second European Resource Bank Meeting (ERBM), 
titled “The European “Third Way”: the Way Forward?,” which 
will take place in Vilnius, October 14-15th, 2005. On behalf 
of the organizing committee the Institute invites the European 
think-tankers to join a gathering of about 200 think-tank 
executives, policy leaders, and experts who share the same 
values of freedom, organised in the capital of Lithuania - the 
bedrock of freedom in the post-Soviet block. 
The mission of ERBM is to improve strategies and to enlarge 
the debate to reach all the people in advancing ideas of 
freedom in Europe. It is also a forum for organizations, experts, 
partners and friends to meet, expand their network, develop 
new ideas and share their experiences. The meeting will be a 
two-day event: it will be a combination of exchange of ideas 
and skill building workshops, followed by a joint ATLAS-
LFMI two-panel session on economic security and concluded 
by a gala dinner. 
Among the featured guests will be Dr. José Piñera, the 
architect of public pension reform in Chile and the founder and 
President of the International Centre for Pension Reform in 
Santjago; Mr. John Blundell of the Institute of Economic 
Affairs; Richard Rahn, Dr. James Tooley and many other 
inspiring contemporary leaders who devote their everyday 
work to fight for freedom. 
The conference will take place in the hotel Reval Hotel 
Lietuva, the newly refurnished hotel in the centre of Vilnius 
and one of the main landmarks in the city. Room reservations 
should be made directly with the hotel. All hotel and event 
information and registration is available online at 
www.rbeurope.org. For any additional information, please 
contact LFMI’s Project Coordinator Simonas Girdzijauskas at 
simonas@freema.org. 
The second European Resource Bank Meeting is organized by 
the Lithuanian Free Market Institute in cooperation with 
Institute for Economic Studies Europe, F.A. v. Hayek Institute, 
Centre for New Europe, International Policy Network, Institute 
Bruno Leoni and ATLAS. 
LFMI analyses potential effects of the euro launch in 
Lithuania 
Seeking to analyse the consequences that the introduction of 
euro may exert on Lithuania, LFMI has competed a study on 
the euro impact on the Lithuanian people and companies. The 
study was presented at a discussion “Major Challenges for 
Lithuania while Joining the Euro Zone” held on May 27, 2005. 
Contrary to the ongoing pro-euro campaign, the event was 
designed to look into, and evaluate, the potential negative 
effects of the euro introduction. To disseminate the message 
more widely and to further the debate on this issue, LFMI 
organised another discussion “The German vs Lithuanian Road 
towards Euro: Practice and Perspectives” on July 14, 2005. 
After weighing the pros and cons of the membership of the 
euro zone, LFMI concluded that the launch of euro in 
Lithuania will have a positive impact on Lithuanian households 
and corporations (the costs incurred in exchanging currencies 
will decrease). However, it will bring negative results as well 
because the certainty and the risk regarding the policy pursued 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) will diminish. Other 
important risk factors are the social financial obligations of 
some major EU member states which can undermine the value 
of euro, and a possible impetus towards the enlargement of the 
euro zone in the field of new harmonisation projects such as 
the harmonisation of the corporate profit tax.  
In the LFMI’s opinion, Lithuania’s membership of the euro 
zone will bring benefit to its people only if competition among 
different currencies remains, if the ECB and European central 
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banks continue a conservative policy and, most importantly, if 
the older EU countries focus on reforming their current 
systems failing to correspond to the economic, demographic 
and social reality. 
Four Lithuanian NGOs have formed a Civic Alliance 
against Corruption 
In May 2005 four Lithuanian non-government organisations – 
the Lithuanian Free Market Institute, Transparency 
International Lithuania, the Institute of Civic Society and the 
Human Rights Monitoring Institute – established a Civic 
Alliance against Corruption. The goal of the Alliance is to take 
an active part in the anti-corruption activities in Lithuania and 
to urge the Government of Lithuania to embark in practice on 
the implementation of the corruption prevention policy. The 
project is supported by the Embassy of the United Kingdom.    
Members of the Alliance will make several studies which will 
show how to build conditions for the society’s participation in 
the fight against corruption and how to strengthen the 
supervision of the ethics of politicians and civil servants. LFMI 
is conducting a study on e-government in Lithuania as the way 
of enhancing the accountability of public administration system 
and improving conditions for citizens’ involvement in the 
decision making process. 
A number of round table discussions and meetings will be held 
with politicians, representatives from the public sector and 
relevant anti-corruption services, law makers and members of 
NGOs seeking to incorporate them into a broad movement 
against corruption. Also, policy proposals will be formulated 
encompassing policy measures on how to improve corruption 
prevention.  
The 15th survey shows first signs of pessimism on the 
market 
In May 2005 LFMI released the 15th survey of the Lithuanian 
economy which is based on market participants’ 2004 
estimates and updated forecasts for 2005. The results of the 
survey are presented in a Lithuanian-English publication. 
Launched in 1997, the LFMI survey is based on the expert 
consensus paradigm originating from the theory of rational 
expectations 
According to the survey of market participants conducted by 
LFMI in January to February 2005, the economic situation in 
Lithuania in 2004-2005 remained stable. The economy is still 
growing rather rapidly, but not as fast as in 2003; the financial 
situation of Lithuanian companies is improving, unemployment 
rates are declining, and the average salaries, although not 
growing as fast as expected in 2004, are expected to increase 
rather considerably in 2005. Economic growth is stimulated by 
growing consumption, a strong domestic market and export 
growth, increasing investments, and brighter expectations of 
both companies and people.  
On the other hand, the survey also shows that the size of rather 
large shadow economy has not been decreasing for several 
years, and instead appear to be growing: market participants 
believe that currently the level of the shadow economy is 
rising. Moreover, as many as four in ten people that officially 
earn the minimum wage additionally receive payments “in 
hand.”  
The general trend of this survey is that market participants’ 
estimates are much more moderate than a year ago. At the 
beginning of 2004, inspired by high expectations of the 
upcoming European Union (EU) accession, market participants 
voiced very optimistic forecasts in almost all sectors. In this 
survey, however, while they still expect to see a constant 
growth in employment, average salaries, investments and 
foreign trade, market participants do not project any rapid 
changes brought about by any external factors.  
Tax Freedom Day in Lithuania Fell on May 5 in 2005 
According to the Lithuanian Free Market Institute’s (LFMI) 
annual calculations, Tax Freedom Day in Lithuania moved 
slightly earlier in the calendar and fell on May 5 this year. In 
2005 the average Lithuanian taxpayer had to work 125 days to 
pay the total tax bill imposed by all levels of government.  
The Tax Freedom Day is a symbolic day in the year when the 
average income earner stops handing over all his income to the 
government and begins to make money for his own and his 
family’s welfare. It is an indicator of the tax burden in relative 
terms which shows what portion of the value created by the 
people is taken by the government to be distributed through the 
national budget and non-budget funds.  
LFMI calculates the tax burden as the ratio of projected total 
tax revenues to net national product (NNP), based on the 
methodology used in other countries as well (USA, Canada, 
UK, etc.). The tax burden, calculated according to this 
methodology, does not encompass money expenditures and 
time costs incurred related to tax administration. Government 
borrowing is not included either, while in Lithuania it is 
constantly growing and may become a tax burden in the future.  
This year Tax Freedom Day in Lithuania arrived three days 
earlier than in 2004 but it doesn’t mean that Lithuanians started 
to pay less in taxes. The total amount of taxes collected to 
finance the state function will be more significant this year as 
compared to 2004. The tax burden in relative terms (!), due to 
bigger NNP generated, will decrease from 35.1 percent in 2004 
to 34.1 percent this year, whereas the tax burden in absolute 
terms will go up, amounting to 19,4 billion litas in 2005 as 
compared with 17,7 billion litas in 2004.  
LFMI started the tradition of commemorating Tax Freedom 
Day in Lithuania in 1993. Since 1993, when the Lithuanian 
taxpayers turned to the government everything they earned 
until April 13, Tax Freedom Day has moved later in the 
calendar. Starting from 2001, Tax Freedom Day came earlier 
every year: on May 15 in 2001, on May 4 in 2002 and on May 
3 in 2003.  
The reform of state registries - among LFMI’s targets 
Seeking to steer the reform of the state registries to market 
relations, on June 9, 2005 LFMI staged a discussion and a 
press conference “Competition in the market of the registry 
services” to present a study on possibilities to reform the state 
registries. In this study LFMI’s policy analysts formulated a 
proposal for the reform in the system of state registries to make 
their services more efficient, accessible and transparent.  
LFMI thinks that it is indispensable to overhaul the system of 
state registries as this would promote the knowledge economy, 
companies’ competitiveness and economic benefit to residents, 
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while access to the information accumulated in registries would 
become quicker and simpler.  
The objects of the study are the registries having the biggest 
commercial value: the registry of real estate, the registry of 
mortgages, the registry of legal persons and the registry of 
residents. It is likely that their reform would bring the most 
considerable potential effect, and there are the biggest 
preconditions that competing service providers would emerge 
in this market.  
The principles of the proposed reform are the following: to 
separate structurally monopoly functions from non-monopoly 
ones; to ensure transparent pricing in the registry sector; to 
treat all consumers of registry services equally; and to shift the 
performance of functions in the electronic medium.  
LFMI states that the drafted reform would unburden the system 
from unnecessary procedures and visiting various institutions, 
increasing alongside the security of the registries and the 
service providers’ responsibility. In addition to that, the reform 
would promote the business of information dissemination and 
competition thereof, drive down the costs and the price of 
services and diminish incentives to steel information. 
LFMI actively supported the idea of more sizeable tax 
reduction 
As the Lithuanian Parliament contemplated the widely 
discussed tax changes, LFMI repeatedly voiced its position and 
recommendations urging the authorities to refrain from 
imposing new taxes and to cut the personal income tax more 
radically.  
As one the final attempts to debate the tax reform, on May 11, 
2005 the Chairman of the Parliament Arturas Paulauskas 
organized a two-hour meeting with Lithuania’s most reputed 
economic and financial experts, LFMI’s President Ugnius 
Trumpa being among them.  
LFMI’s President also took part in a meeting held by the 
President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus the next day after 
which the country’s prominent economists unanimously 
asserted that there were other alternatives to compensate for 
budget losses rather than introducing a new tax on business. 
However, the Parliament adopted the fiercely opposed new tax 
as a source of budget revenues to offset the ensuing losses after 
the enacted personal income tax cuts.  
 
*** 
 
 
        
 
 
The following commentrary was posted online on the news 
agency‘s ELTA portal on May 4, 2005. The author looks into 
the problem of smuggling and its relation with high excise 
duties applied in the EU.  
 
How Long the EU will be Blind to Smuggling? 
By Giedrius Kadziauskas, Policy Analyst, LFMI 
Several days ago a news release was issued informing about 
approaching new increases in prices of tobacco products and 
fuel as Lithuania’s commitment to the European Union. In 
other words, the level of excise duties in Lithuania is to reach 
the minimal level set up by the EU. It’s evident enough that 
this minimal level is not minimal at all for Lithuania and other 
newcomers of the EU where the level of income and the living 
standard are expected to rise to the EU average only in some 15 
to 30 years. Supposedly, the news was broadcast to let people 
get prepared to buy more expensive cigarettes and petrol, to 
look for their cheaper substitutes and, finally, to get used to the 
idea that news about the leaking Lithuanian border is a natural, 
inevitable and heightening malady.   
Meanwhile, smuggling is growing with gusto! Every single rise 
in excise duties messages to smugglers-entrepreneurs about the 
swelling ranks of their potential customers and that they have 
an opportunity to mark up prices of their goods. It is impossible 
to measure the real scale of smuggling. The least recorded 
crimes are those which leave behind no victim and which do 
not harm a specific person. Such is the nature of smuggling: 
except a group of border-guards and a number of payers of 
excise duties and producers of legal goods, all the rest are 
satisfied – consumers, smugglers and a certain number of 
border-guards or customs officials.  
One of the indicators, which is the source to start calculating 
the scale of smuggling, is the quantity of detained illegally 
carried cigarettes. According to the data of the State Border 
Guard Service, this quantity has been multiplying by double 
every year since 2001: the number of packages of cigarettes 
captured at the border amounted to 0,25 million in 2001, 0,5 
million in 2002, 1,5 million in 2003 and 3,4 million in 2004. 
There is no doubt that having such experience in apprehending 
smuggled products and financial support from the EU the 
efficiency of the work of officials safeguarding the border and 
the customs has improved. However, it’s logical that if 
smuggling did not proliferate, the number of smuggled 
cigarettes detained should go down along with the officials’ 
advancing efficiency. This is because aggravated penetrability 
of the border increases the price of the end-use product.  
A survey carried out by the Lithuanian Free Market Institute 
(LFMI) in 2004 showed that more than a half of cigarette 
consumers buy smuggled cigarettes at least once in a while. 
About a third of all cigarette consumers buy illicit cigarette 
supplies regularly or frequently. This data and the growing 
number of detained cigarettes demonstrate that the potentially 
improved border protection and a rising number of captured 
illicit goods fail to curb this illegal activity, currently 
developing more rapidly than before.  
Problems arise not just in Lithuania. For example, in Sweden 
1,35 million cigarette packages were confiscated in 2002, while 
the number in 2003 was 3,7 million. In Great Britain, empty 
cigarette packages collected after a football match showed that 
more than 90 percent of cigarettes smoked at the stadium that 
day had been smuggled. Great Britain estimates that as a result 
of illicit trade of tobacco products its budget does not collect 
income of about 6 billion euro from excise taxes and VAT.  
Revenues from increased excise duties go into the 
government’s pocket, while multiplied profits from sales of 
illegal goods serve as investments into the smuggling business. 
Observing such favourable business conditions, the bosses of 
smuggling don’t lack ideas. Starting at the lowest level, the 
working and living conditions are facilitated for the so-called 
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“ichtyomen,”∗ drivers of enhanced-enlarged cross-country 
vehicles, old ladies-sellers and other lowest-income employees. 
Ending at the highest level, prevention of punishment is tackled 
by trimming the list of punishable actions of smuggling, by 
softening sanctions laid down in the Penal Code or by dealing 
with prevention of penalties for smugglers directly in courts.  
It’s natural that once a smuggling business is established, and 
all its chains are functioning, its owner will be willing to 
exploit the investments made and to carry en rout a woman, a 
bomb or a bar of uranium, let alone such “ordinary” goods as 
footwear and wardrobe. Another way to employ profits from 
smuggling is to lend them to those who cannot lend from 
official sources. Shortly after the war against terrorism broke 
out, some newspapers in the U.S.A. published information that 
part of terrorist activities had been financed from illegal trade 
of tobacco products among the States. Similar opinions are 
cropping up as regards the origin of terrorist funding in Europe. 
So Lithuanian smugglers-bankers have ample opportunity to 
take into their pocket if not European, so at least Lithuanian 
villains. 
Increased accessibility to smuggled cigarettes is a roadblock to 
achieve the goals of health care and juvenile prevention. One 
of such goals, sought by high excise duties on fuel, tobacco and 
alcohol products, is all governments’ desire to reduce overall 
consumption of these products for the purposes of environment 
protection and society’s heath care. Cheap illicit tobacco 
products close the door on this aspiration as significantly 
cheaper smuggled goods are frequently of poorer quality and 
more easily accessed by consumers than the legal ones.  
The opponents of high excise taxes or small cigarette packages 
argue that cheap tobacco products will become obtainable by 
children who usually don’t have large amounts of money. But 
the opportunity to get cheap smuggled cigarettes without any 
control blocks the way for making tobacco goods as remote 
from youngsters as possible. Selling of cheap legal tobacco 
products to some extent can be controlled by disciplining 
salespeople and building a general environment of intolerance 
for structures that sell tobacco to teenagers. But it isn’t like that 
in the marketplace or in kiosks where cigarettes from under the 
counter can be purchased by anyone who is tall enough to hand 
in cash.  
LFMI consistently advocates lower taxes for either sugar or 
tobacco products as it evaluates their impact not just on the 
consumer or producer alone, but also on the overall economy. 
Although it’s unpopular or even risky to talk about the 
reduction of excise duties on tobacco products, yet it is 
indispensable to look into the roots and the consequences of 
this problem.  
It’s only a matter of time when serious debates will be 
launched regarding the effectiveness of policy on excise taxes 
and its effects on the security in the EU. Only a threat to 
security and the amounts of euros thrown at safeguarding the 
EU’s exterior border, being conducted by the new member 
states, will force the EU officials to speak about changing the 
course of the excise duty policy by starting to remove the 
minimal level that the new EU countries are to adjust.  
                                                 
∗ The so-called “ichtyomen” in Lithuania are smugglers who participate in the 
chain of illegal carrying of goods by swimming under the water across the river 
Nemunas, from the Kaliningrad Region to Lithuania.  
Various calculations show that evaluating increased excise 
duties and higher income of Lithuanian households, tobacco 
products will be less affordable by Lithuanians in 2008, as 
compared with the current situation. Consequently, satisfying 
the needs of the expanding market of smuggled tobacco goods 
will be the major source of smugglers’ profit and Lithuanian 
government’s headache in the future. Most importantly, this 
headache should become an EU-wide ailment because the 
remedy – the decision regarding lower excise duties – rests in 
the corridors of the European Union.  
 
*** 
 
 
 
In the following article LFMI‘s Vice-president Guoda 
Steponaviciene speaks about what happens when regulators 
start "organizing" competition. The article about 
telecommunication regulation was posted on 
http://www.techcentralstation.be/, a free-market oriented, on-
line think tank, on May 6, 2005.  
 
The Worm Turns 
By Guoda Steponavičiene, LFMI’s Vice-president 
EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes argues that 
antitrust and state-aid regulation in EU countries must be 
reinforced in order to spur competition. The same idea is rather 
widely elaborated in the revised Lisbon Agenda for growth and 
jobs.  
True, increased competition is always beneficial for 
consumers, market development and the general well-being. 
However, this is only if one is referring to natural, not artificial, 
competition -- when companies compete for consumers and 
their money by offering the most desired services at the lowest 
possible prices. To be sure, some suppliers are more successful 
in this struggle and gain a bigger number of consumers; some 
are less so and have only a small market share. Remember that 
market shares are constantly changing and no victory is ever 
final. This is especially true of fast developing services such as 
telecommunications. A popular new service, technology or 
scheme of payment can substantially change the range of 
leaders, despite the efforts of the regulator and without an 
infusion of taxpayer money. 
Mistrust of market competition is often fueled by the fact that 
some operators gained their market share at a time when 
competition was legally restricted due to monopoly rights 
granted to one player. This incumbent operator (as a rule -- in 
fixed telephony) enjoys a competitive advantage due to 
historical legacy. As in all other sectors, a concept of dominant 
operator is used. Domination in the market (according to the 
EU's competition legislation, this means having 40 percent of 
the market share) implies additional obligations towards other 
market players -- compliance with which is closely controlled 
by the regulator. 
 The present paradigm of telecommunications regulation in the 
EU could be called a concept of "efficient competition" based 
on ex ante regulations of so called SMPs -- operators holding 
significant market power. A business is considered to be an 
SMP "when either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys 
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a position of economic strength affording it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, 
customers and ultimately consumers".  
 From a technical point of view this change in competition 
policy from dominant to significant market power could be 
considered merely a reinforcement of the former principle. 
Seeking to avoid abusive behavior of overly strong market 
participants, only one operator (or their group) was regulated 
before; under the SMP scheme, several operators are seen as 
being able to abuse consumers and thus are regulated. 
However, from an economic point of view this is a 
fundamental change in competition policy.  
First of all, it diminishes a popular argument about the unfair 
starting conditions of the incumbents and other operators: now, 
every market participant, even the newest one, can be 
recognized as a potential abuser and thus restricted. Second, 
significant market power, as compared to dominant power, is a 
rather softly defined concept, which leaves the decision to the 
regulator. Third, while the obligation for the dominant operator 
in essence used to be its price control (the so called price cap), 
for the SMP it also means its activity control: obligation to 
connect to the infrastructure, obligation of non-discrimination, 
obligation to proof costs and so on. 
All of this raises two major questions for the present 
framework of telecommunications regulation policy and 
practice: first, why to regulate and, second, what undertakings 
to regulate.  
As the framework directive describes, the goal of regulation is 
"to ensure that users derive maximum benefit in terms of 
choice, price and quality; ensure that there is no distortion or 
restriction of competition in the sector, encouraging efficient 
investment in infrastructure and promoting innovation and 
encouraging efficient use and ensuring the effective 
management of radio frequencies and numbering resources."  
The last goal, no doubt, should be in regulators' hands. 
However, in a market economy most of other goals used to be 
pursued by companies competing for the consumer. By 
definition, the goal of every economic undertaking in the 
market is to ensure maximum benefit for the user and efficient 
allocation of resources (investment, innovation). As for 
distortions and restrictions of competition, it is not clear what 
these might be. If we talk about legally granted exceptions (like 
monopolies) or legal restrictions on innovations, the regulator's 
obligation is to identify them and take them away. However, if 
market distortion is understood as natural differences of the 
market share, then we have an artificial market.  
Services are never identical in an actual market and can't be so. 
So are benefits for users. Measure the benefits of different user 
groups over different time spans, and they all will differ. No 
one can achieve ultimate maximum benefit -- there is always a 
trade-off between immediate and future achievements, between 
favoring one or another type of clients.  
Free competition in the market ensures distribution of these 
trade-offs: some operators prefer cheap and simple services to 
reach a large number of customers; some, investments to 
enhance the quality of services the next year; others, 
innovations in entirely new technology which (at high risk) 
will pay back in the long run. When the regulator steps in and 
starts "organizing" competition, the trade-offs are distributed 
according to the regulator's view and ability to measure. As in 
all cases of administrative distribution, the ability to measure is 
based on averages. Therefore, firstly, an artificial evening out 
of the operators' behavior is unavoidable. Secondly, some types 
of users can be entirely at a disadvantage. The first 
consequence leads to less choice for consumers, weaker 
competition and slower development of the market. The second 
consequence is just unfair.  
 According to the SMP definition, efficient competition is not 
in place when an undertaking or a group of them can act 
independently from competitors and consumers. This definition 
looks simple and even logical. However, if we look at the 
criteria for SMP recognition, we end up where we started: 
competition is when companies compete in the market…  
SMP recognition is closely related to the definition of the 
market. According to the recommendations of the European 
Commission, 18 separate markets are distinguished in 
electronic communications. Each of these markets is analyzed 
by national regulators and SMPs are named for each of the 
market. This differentiation of the electronic communication 
market is another feature betraying the artificial nature of such 
reasoning -- do consumers buy e-communication services from 
x or y number of markets? Do suppliers engage in z different 
fields of activity? No, both consumers and suppliers simply 
communicate electronically in this world around us, while the 
regulators under detailed EU-wide regulations construct an 
alternative world with numerous sub-markets and trace each 
sign of domination through them. It may be appropriate for a 
post-modern virtual thinking, but economically it is infeasible  
 Those who have not forgotten yet the taste of a real apple 
should also remember that real apples sometimes have worms. 
A worm in the apple is not a pleasant surprise. But no 
consumer of real apples would think to report to some state 
agency blaming the gardener for this worm. It's because 
consumers have a choice -- a good-smelling apple with taste, 
though not perfectly round, red and whole; or a round, red and 
whole apple, but entirely artificial. Those who have ever tasted 
a real apple and understand the choice, vote for the former. 
 
 
 *** 
 
        
 
Rather than a strategy for EU salvation and economic growth 
the Lisbon Strategy might turn into a tragedy, writes Ugnius 
Trumpa, President of the Lithuanian Free Market Institute. His 
commentary was posted on the EUobserver.com, an 
independent and the largest online news site focused on the 
European Unijon (May 19, 2005).  
 
The Lisbon Strategy or a Lisbon Tragedy? 
By Ugnius Trumpa, President, LFMI 
 
The agenda of the latest EU summit focused on two key issues: 
the services directive and the criteria of the Stability Pact. 
However, preparations for the summit provoked heated 
discussions about the Lisbon Strategy and its future in the EU 
and the European Parliament. 
                                     COMMENTS 
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President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso 
pointed out, with good reason, that the prospects of 
implementing the Lisbon Strategy depended on the services 
directive.  
The summit is over and it is already clear today that the 
prospects of the services directive are dismal, while the newly 
adopted changes to the Stability Pact, which are called 
exemptions, will acknowledge de jure the financial instability 
of several of the EU member-states and allow the European 
Commission to turn a blind eye to it.  
Although upon the accession to the European Union many of 
the new member-states proclaimed their aspirations to join the 
European Monetary Union as soon as possible, the adoption of 
the exemptions in question raises serious doubts about the euro 
as a stable and credible currency given that every year more 
and more countries fail to comply with one or even several of 
the Maastricht criteria.  
After the membership agreements are signed with Bulgaria and 
Romania, not only the European Commission but also all of the 
member states are likely to be faced with more economic, 
social and border security concerns.  
What is in store for the European Union and the Lisbon 
Strategy if the underlying principles of a single market and 
transparent and stable public finances of the member-states are 
so easily flouted?  
At a recent discussion of the Lisbon Strategy, authoritative 
experts made a foregone conclusion that the Lisbon Strategy 
had died. For many, this opinion may appear to be unexpected 
and unacceptable at first glance. But let’s look at the results of 
the first five years of implementing the Lisbon Strategy and its 
prospects. 
Management or political declarations? 
A strategy is an established term in management theory and 
practice. It is about drawing a clear action plan that reflects and 
is in line with rationally assessed circumstances and resources.  
The principle of open coordination, which underlay the 
implementation of the Lisbon Strategy from the very 
beginning, is in principle unsuitable for handling any kind of 
strategy.  
For this reason the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy was 
from the very start nothing but free "drifting" of the member 
states towards objectives that were set by way of political 
compromise and therefore often appeared to clash with one 
another.  
Developing a strategy for the whole of the European Union and 
setting detailed objectives that are directly independent of 
government authorities is unfeasible if only because economic 
and social processes, which are spontaneous in their essence 
and are only indirectly affected by government and actions, 
cannot be an object of strategic planning.  
If strategic planning were applied to social and economic 
processes at the national level, such planning would lead to 
totalitarianism and social engineering.  
So the Lisbon strategy is unfeasible because its object is not a 
specific organisation like, the European Commission, but the 
whole European Union and its economy.  
For the aforesaid reasons even appointing responsible officials 
"Mr or Ms Lisbon" in the member states cannot serve as a part 
of the salvation plan for the strategy. Rather, this would inflict 
more bureaucracy on good initiatives and discredit them. 
The strategy’s Achilles’ heel  
The old EU member-states differ in terms of their economic 
capacities to achieve the social goals and specific indicators. 
For Portugal, Greece and even Spain, economic growth is 
today task number one because these countries would simply 
lack the resources necessary to accomplish other objectives.  
As the strategy was created without allowance being made for 
the accession of the new member-states, there is a programmed 
gap between the Lisbon Strategy and the strategic goals and 
policy measures pursued by the newcomers.  
Another problem is with the sectoral view on specific parts of 
the strategy and a lack of clear priorities. This creates 
conditions for institutional contradictions in implementing the 
strategy by the member states, while an absence of a 
coordinating centre and a lack of interim evaluations make any 
goals or assessment tools meaningless.  
It is regrettable that the integration process, which was evident 
enough at that time, was neither assessed nor taken into 
account while developing and implementing the strategy. 
The revamped strategy promises some change 
There is no doubt that the revision of the strategy brought in 
positive changes.  
The main strength of the updated strategy is the focus on 
economic growth as compared with the goals of social 
cohesion and sustainable development.  
Scrapping the declarative goal of becoming a world leader and 
cutting down the objectives were certainly positive moves.  
The deplorable results of the first five years led to necessary 
changes in administering the strategy too. The open 
coordination principle was foregone in favour of direct 
dialogue between the member states and the Commission. This 
is likely to enhance administrative effectiveness.  
It is not clear whether the consolidation of the administration of 
the Lisbon Strategy and the appointment of a responsible 
minister in each member state will become positive factors.  
After all, this means creating another bureaucratic structure 
whose effectiveness will depend on the political will of the 
national government and parliament. It is not clear whether a 
local "Mr or Ms Lisbon" will manage to put the Lisbon goals 
above national political or economic interests.  
However, a single national plan and a single report (a sectoral 
principle was applied before) will facilitate the task of 
assessing the effectiveness of the plans and policy measures 
used. 
The fundamental flaws remain 
The main shortcoming of the updated strategy is that economic 
growth, which is emphasized in the strategy, is not viewed as 
the foundation of any social or environmental objectives.  
This causes parallelism between the objectives, just like the 
previous version declared a pro-active position in those areas 
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where economic processes occur spontaneously (such as 
competition, business and science relationships).  
With regard to the compatibility and links of the strategy with 
other key reform initiatives, it is alarming that no attention is 
paid to structural reforms - like CAP reform.  
Likewise, it is unclear whether constantly cited investments in 
R&D will not distort the market and whether they will be 
effective if used by public scientific and educational 
establishments; especially in the new member states.  
It is regrettable that making assessments in terms of budget 
expenditures (e.g. 3 percent of GDP for R&D) rather than in 
terms of the effectiveness of the goals achieved and the 
measures used to achieve these goals is still a popular practice.  
In addition to that, the strategy contains not only parallel but 
also opposite objectives -for example, maintaining jobs and to 
achieve a flexible labour market. Although the updated strategy 
emphasizes the role of social partners, the recent terror that 
trade unions in the old member-states employed against 
companies in the new member-states shows that labour 
mobility and competition will be strongly resisted.  
The opposition against the services directive that had been 
unleashed before the recent summit in Brussels shows that 
reluctance to compete is the biggest obstacle to economic 
growth and the development of the single market.  
The state or state-funded services sector and trade unions in the 
old member-states have been the biggest drag on economic 
growth, and these forces are likely to hinder the 
implementation of the Lisbon Strategy.  
Given the inherent contradictions and weaknesses of the 
strategy plus the unfavourable external environment, this plan 
might become a "Lisbon tragedy" rather than a strategy for EU 
salvation and economic growth.  
 
 
   *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Free Market is a quarterly newsletter of the Lithuanian Free Market 
Institute, disseminated in electronic form for free. 
 
Sign-up for our free newsletter! 
 
To receive The free Market, please send your name and e-mail address at 
Asta@freema.org.  
 
The Free Market is posted on-line at www.freema.org/NewsLetter/index.phtml. 
 
Please e-mail your questions and comments at Asta@freema.org. 
 
© LFMI, 1996 - 2002. All rights reserved. Reproduction of articles is permitted, 
provided credit is given and copy of the reprinted material is sent to LFMI. To 
request permission to reprint The Free Market articles, please call (370-5) 272 
4241 or e-mail Asta@freema.org.  
 
*** 
The Free Market is published by the Lithuanian Free Market Institute – an 
independent non-profit organisation established in 1990 to advance the ideas of 
individual freedom and responsibility, free market and limited government. Our 
motto is 
 
If you don't create a free market, a black market will emerge 
 
The founders of LFMI are – Prof. Kęstutis Glaveckas, Nijolė Žambaitė, Dainius 
Pupkevičius, Petras Auštrevičius, Elena Leontjeva and Darius Mockus. 
 
LFMI pursues its mission by conducting research on key economic policy 
issues, developing conceptual reform packages, submitting policy 
recommendations at the legislative and executive levels, drafting and evaluating 
legislation, and launching public campaigns. LFMI‘s activities also include 
sociological surveys, publications, conferences, workshops, and lectures.   
 
LFMI receives financial support from individuals, corporations and foundations. 
Devoted to the principles of private ownership, LFMI accepts no funds form the 
Lithuanian government. 
 
LFMI’s  address: 
Lithuanian Free Market Institute 
16A J.Jasinskio  Str. 
2001 Vilnius 
Lithuania 
Tel. (370-5) 252 6255, (370-5) 252 6263 
Fax (370-5) 252 6258 
www.freema.org (English) 
www.lrinka.lt (Lithuanian)  
 
